Background Surgery for intersex infants should be delayed until individuals are able to decide for themselves, except where it is a medical necessity. In an ideal world, this single principle would suffice and such surgeries could be totally prohibited. Unfortunately, the world is not perfect, and, in some places, intersex neonates are at risk of being abandoned, mutilated or even killed. As long as intersex persons are at such high risk in some places, any ethical guidelines for intersex surgeries (...) will need to take these extreme risks of harm into account. Main text I therefore argue for five basic principles that ought to inform ethics guidelines for surgical interventions in intersex children, specifically in contexts in which such children are at risk of significant harm. What I set out to come up with is a set of principles that do not completely prohibit surgery, but only allow it where a strong case can be made for its necessity, in the best interests of the child, and where there is some kind of oversight to prevent misuse. The first principle is that interventions as drastic as these surgeries should only be performed when there is strong evidence that they are beneficial and not harmful. The second principle is that in surgeries should normally only be performed in cases of true medical necessity. Principle three is that surgeries should normally be delayed until such time as the intersex person is mature enough to assent to treatment or decide against it. Principle four is that the conventional ethical requirements regarding truth telling apply equally to intersex children as to anyone else. The final principle is that where physicians or parents think that surgery is in the best interests of the child, the burden of proof lies with them. Conclusion It is hoped that these principles might help medical teams and parents make better decisions about intersex surgeries on children, and they would make such surgeries very rare indeed, if they happen at all. (shrink)

Despite the lack of invariance problem (the many‐to‐many mapping between acoustics and percepts), human listeners experience phonetic constancy and typically perceive what a speaker intends. Most models of human speech recognition (HSR) have side‐stepped this problem, working with abstract, idealized inputs and deferring the challenge of working with real speech. In contrast, carefully engineered deep learning networks allow robust, real‐world automatic speech recognition (ASR). However, the complexities of deep learning architectures and training regimens make it difficult to use them to (...) provide direct insights into mechanisms that may support HSR. In this brief article, we report preliminary results from a two‐layer network that borrows one element from ASR, long short‐term memory nodes, which provide dynamic memory for a range of temporal spans. This allows the model to learn to map real speech from multiple talkers to semantic targets with high accuracy, with human‐like timecourse of lexical access and phonological competition. Internal representations emerge that resemble phonetically organized responses in human superior temporal gyrus, suggesting that the model develops a distributed phonological code despite no explicit training on phonetic or phonemic targets. The ability to work with real speech is a major advance for cognitive models of HSR. (shrink)

In the third century AD, under the pressure of plagues, external invasion, rising army costs, and usurpation, the Roman emperors incrementally debased the silver coinage that was produced at their imperial mints and incrementally took over civic mints. The debasement, from 2.7 g of silver to 0.04 g of silver in the equivalent of a denarius from 160–274 ad, was accompanied by worries from emperors, mint-workers, and bankers about the value of the currency; however, the total loss of purchasing power (...) of the Roman coinage from the same era was 50–70 %, far less than would be expected from the change in metallic content, if it were the primary source of value. The currency reform of Aurelian in 274 ad, despite raising metallic values of coins, was followed by at least a 90 % reduction in the purchasing power of the silver coinage from 274–301 ad, the year of Diocletian’s Edict on Maximum Prices, showing a paradoxically inverse relationship between metallic value and purchasing power. Based on this quandary, I argue that the Roman silver coinage of the third century CE became a fiat currency in some respects, deriving its guarantee from imperial iconography and assurances rather than from bullion value. The fiat nature of the silver coinage was largely present in usage as a medium of exchange for those without as much long-term interest in maintaining liquid stores of value; this is indicated by the differential debasement of the denarius and aureus; imperial actions and hoarding practices indicate the extent to which the currency was accepted at nominal value. I examine the reactions of different social groups in order to determine the perceived value of the Roman coinage during this time, and in order to understand the paradoxical collapse in the currency’s value in the late third century. To demonstrate this, I will present the applicable elements of the modern concept of “fiat” to this context through portrayal of emperors and usurpers on coins, use coin hoard data to determine the effect of Gresham’s Law, and examine historical and papyrological accounts of currency reforms. I will also use evidence of the expansion of taxes in kind and the rejection of nominal value by both emperor and subjects to argue that the inflation following Aurelian’s reform resulted from an invalidation of the trust in imperial fiat. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Death: A Persistent Controversial StateKevin Wm. Wildes S.J. (bio)Along with the moral questions surrounding research and experimentation, the moral questions of death and dying have ranked among the most central and formative sets of issues for the field of bioethics. While the questions of death and dying have a long history (Wildes 1996), the attempt to address them as secular questions is an element of what established bioethics (...) as a field of inquiry.The controversies of death and dying are not only formative of bioethics, but also are among the most persistent bioethical controversies. Today, almost 30 years after the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee’s definition of death and 20 years after the Quinlan decision, the questions of death and dying are still with us. Recently, the question of physician-assisted suicide once again gained national [End Page 378] attention with the trials of Dr. Kevorkian and the decisions of the Ninth and Second Circuit Courts on the constitutionality of the Washington and New York state laws prohibiting physician-assisted suicide. At the same time, questions and controversies about the appropriate extent of treatment and the determination of death in relationship to treatment continue to be problematic in health care.As I reviewed the literature in the area of death and dying, one central question emerged: Why, after so much reflection, energy, and discussion, do the problems around death and dying continue to persist? There is a recurring character to these questions that is indeed a wonder. In reviewing these moral controversies, one might ask what these controversies and their persistent character tell us about bioethics that can help us to understand the issues and the field.Some might blame the development of medical technology for the persistence of these issues of death and dying. The development and use of technological resources certainly is an important element of these continuing controversies. The use of medical technologies at the end of life allows us the possibility to sustain lives that would have been lost just a few decades ago. However, while medical technology certainly opens new horizons and possibilities, the development and deployment of technology does not sufficiently explain why these issues are so difficult and persistent. The question underlying the use of medical technology at the end of life is the question about which criteria are to be used to make judgments about the appropriate use of such technology. If the use of medical technology depends on the moral views one holds about death, suffering, and the appropriate use of resources, then such issues will be morally controversial in a society that is morally pluralistic.To address these questions, it is important to remember what is all too obvious and yet often forgotten. Death is not only a medical event. In this century, particularly in the last 40 years, we have reduced death to a medical event, yet, the medical meanings do not exhaust the event (see Engelhardt 1996, pp. 189–238). Death is also a social, cultural, and often religious event and the medical realities of death must be interpreted within these different contexts. As such, death will be the locus of different meanings and interpretations. By keeping these different structures of interpretation in mind, we are better able to understand why controversies around death and dying persist. Just as the meaning of death will vary from culture to culture, so too will the criteria of death vary. Different moral communities have different criteria for death—e.g., pulmonary or cognitive function. Put another way, different communities and cultures will have different views of what constitutes a good life, and those views influence the way death is understood. How one understands the obligations to support life also varies according to one’s moral commitments and values.One’s view of what counts as death, or what counts as a good death, is influenced [End Page 379] by the moral commitments that one holds. The persistent controversies over death and dying are a symptom of deep, widespread moral and cultural pluralism. These views are controversial because, in many ways, our deaths are no longer private. That is, the way we die often is tied to a health... (shrink)

Do you persist as the same person over time because you keep the same mind or because you keep the same body? Philosophers have long investigated this question of personal identity with thought experiments. Cognitive scientists have joined this tradition by assessing lay intuitions about those cases. Much of this work has focused on judgments of identity continuity. But identity also has practical significance: obligations are tagged to one's identity over time. Understanding how someone persists as the same person (...) over time could provide insight into how and why moral and legal obligations persist. In this paper, we investigate judgments of obligations in hypothetical cases where a person's mind and body diverge (e.g., brain transplant cases). We find a striking pattern of results: In assigning obligations in these identity test cases, people are divided among three groups: “body‐followers,” “mind‐followers,” and “splitters”—people who say that the obligation is split between the mind and the body. Across studies, responses are predicted by a variety of factors, including mind/body dualism, essentialism, education, and professional training. When we give this task to professional lawyers, accountants, and bankers, we find they are more inclined to rely on bodily continuity in tracking obligations. These findings reveal not only the heterogeneity of intuitions about identity but how these intuitions relate to the legal standing of an individual's obligations. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.3 (2001) 443-445 [Access article in PDF] Martin Schönfeld. The Philosophy of the Young Kant: The Precritical Project. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. xv + 348. Cloth, $55.00. Kant's precritical philosophy has often been judged as lacking continuity, originality, and, indeed, philosophical relevance. Martin Schönfeld's impressive new study disputes this assessment, claiming instead that "the philosophy of the young Kant reveals (...) a greater unity and a more interesting coherence than previously assumed" (245). The author further argues that Kant's precritical thought is philosophically interesting in its own right. Schönfeld is to be commended for his successful refutation of the standard caricature and for deftly defending his reading of this formative period in Kant's thought. Recent years have seen a number of similar attempts to rehabilitate Kant's precritical thought, but Schönfeld's study will no doubt become the standard against which future scholarship is measured. [End Page 443]Schönfeld locates the unity of Kant's precritical philosophy in his purported "grand synthesis of the Newtonian model of nature with three assumptions of metaphysics: the purposive development of nature, the possibility of a morally relevant freedom, and the existence of God" (209). Schönfeld divides Kant's precritical philosophy into three periods comprising (1) Kant's initial failure during the 1740s to formulate a non-Newtonian philosophy of nature, (2) his conversion to Newtonianism in the 1750s (and the constructive philosophizing of this period), and (3) the period of intense self-criticism in the 1760s leading to the collapse of the precritical project. The originality of Schönfeld's typology is evident since many scholars claim that Kant was a Newtonian ab initio. In addition, Schönfeld claims that the precritical project ends with the "Dreams of a Spirit-Seer" (1766), a departure from the orthodox extension of the project to the "Inaugural Dissertation" (1770).Such readings are driven by the author's generally trenchant analyses of Kant's attempt to construct a unified philosophy of nature. In this regard, Schönfeld's analysis of Kant's attempt to reconcile physical processes and purposiveness in the "Universal Natural History" (1755) is particularly insightful; and Kant's attempts to account for the compatibility of determinism and human freedom in the "New Elucidation" (1755) and to formulate a theory of active matter in the "Physical Monadology" (1766) receive readings of a similarly high caliber. In addition, Schönfeld's extensive bibliography and his many references to thinkers now long-forgotten—yet indispensable for understanding Kant's early thought (e.g., Georg Bilfinger, a Wolffian thinker and source for Kant's lifelong strategy of seeking a via media between opposing positions)—are invaluable research tools.Also deserving mention is Schönfeld's examination of the "Dreams" essay. Once thought to be a mere critique of Swedenborg's mysticism, this work actually marks the beginning of Kant's doubts regarding the very possibility of speculative metaphysics. The precritical philosophy is largely concerned with the nature of real interaction between substances—contra occasionalist and pre-established harmony theories—and with Kant's interpretation of physical influx that grounds the same. Yet Kant realizes in the "Dreams" that his own account of a commercium of substances (as well as his claims regarding the soul) seems to lead quite naturally to the notion of a divine influx governing the interaction of disembodied spirits (regarding which Swedenborg purported to have first-hand experience). This realization, Schönfeld argues, motivates the collapse of the precritical project and Kant's recognition that an examination of mental capabilities must precede any speculation regarding nonsensible objects. It is to Schönfeld's credit that he takes this text, which is usually either ignored or ridiculed, seriously and presents a comprehensive and cogent reading of the same.Though generally successful in defending his reading of the precritical Kant, some of Schönfeld's positions are rather suspect. Indeed, Schönfeld claims that "in the 1740s, Kant either rejected Newtonian ideas out of hand, or he... (shrink)

Most donated organs in the United States come from brain dead donors, while a small percentage come from patients who die in “controlled,” or expected, circumstances, typically after the family or surrogate makes a decision to withdraw life support. The number of organs available for transplant could be substantially if donations were permitted in “uncontrolled” circumstances–that is, from people who die unexpectedly, often outside the hospital. According to projections from the Institute of Medicine, establishing programs permitting “uncontrolled donation after circulatory (...) determination of death,” or uDCDD, throughout the United States has the potential to provide 22,000 more donation opportunities annually. In contrast, U.S. controlled donation after circulatory determination of death, or cDCDD, cases have increased progressively over the past decade from 87 to 848 donors, but currently account for only 10.6 percent of all deceased donors. Following the IOM recommendations, several projects exploring the feasibility of uDCDD were funded by the federal government, including a grant from the Health Resources and Services Administration that supported a pilot project in New York City in which the authors of this article participated.A key feature of our protocol, and indeed of many uDCDD protocols, is the initiation of preservation methods such as chest compressions and extracorporeal membrane oxygenation shortly after death in order to perfuse and preserve the donor's organs. Critics of uDCDD argue that the means of determining death deviates from generally ascribed principles. They assert that reinstituting circulation in order to preserve organs has the effect of “undoing” the prior determination of death. The result is that cDCDD is widely accepted and practiced routinely even though it only marginally increases the number of organs available for transplantation, and uDCDD is widely considered unacceptable despite being ethically embraced and proven to significantly increase organ donation opportunities in other countries. This article explores the evolution of this counterintuitive state of affairs and calls for a policy that, in line with the IOM report, allows for both cDCDD and uDCDD protocols. (shrink)

I give an account how the principle of ‘respect for autonomy’ dominates the field of bioethics, and how it came to triumph over its competitors, ‘respect for persons’ and ‘respect for free power of choice’. I argue that ‘respect for autonomy’ is unsatisfactory as a basic principle of bioethics because it is grounded in too individualistic a worldview, citing concerns of African theorists and other communitarians who claim that the principle fails to acknowledge the fundamental importance of understanding persons within (...) the nexus of their communal relationships. I defend the claim that ‘respect for persons’ is a more appropriate principle, as it is able to acknowledge both individual decision making and the essential relationality of persons. I acknowledge that my preference for ‘respect for persons’ is problematic because of the important debate around the definition of ‘personhood’ in bioethics discourse. Relying on Thaddeus Metz's conception of moral status, I propose a relational definition of personhood that distinguishes between persons with agency and persons without agency, arguing that we have different moral obligations to these distinct categories of persons. I claim that this conception of personhood is better able to accommodate our moral intuitions than conventional approaches, and that it is able to do so without being speciesist or question-begging. (shrink)

Although many bioethicists have given attention to the special health issues of Africa and to the ethics of research on the continent, only a handful have considered these issues through the lens of African moral thought. The question has been for the most part neglected as to what a distinctively African moral perspective would be for the analysis and teaching of bioethics issues. To address the oversight, the authors of this paper describe embarking on a project aimed at incorporating African (...) moral perspective, values and philosophy into a teaching curriculum. The authors clarify the rationale for the project and discuss the strategies employed in Africanizing the bioethics curriculum. (shrink)

A recent study using a crossmodal matching task showed that the identity of a talker could be recognized even when the auditory and visual stimuli that were being matched were different sentences spoken by the talker. This finding implies that general temporal features of a person's speech are shared across the auditory and visual modalities.

Contributing reviewersThe editors of Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine would like to thank all our reviewers who have contributed to the journal in Volume 10.

The Children’s Act and its associated regulations allow for virginity tests to be performed on male and female children over the age of 16. This is subject to a number of legislated conditions, including that informed consent should be obtained. In this article I argue that, whilst it is important that the right to social and cultural practice be protected in South Africa, virginity testing is a practice that cannot be morally justified. Firstly, I defend the claim that the practice (...) is inherently unjust. At least some of those subjected to the tests will inevitably experience the undesirable consequences of a false test result. The practice is also discriminatory as it typically and unjustly targets girl children, since boys are far less commonly tested. I argue further that the practice perpetuates a harmful patriarchal social order. Finally, I contend that any attempts to justify this legislation are fatally flawed, because it is fundamentally irrational, since there is no reliable means of testing for virginity. (shrink)

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act turns to a nontraditional mechanism to improve public health: employer -provided financial incentives for healthy behaviors. Critics raise questions about incentive programs' effectiveness, employer involvement, and potential discrimination. We support incentive program development despite these concerns. The ACA sets the stage for a broad-based research and implementation agenda through which we can learn to structure incentive programs to not only promote public health but also address prevalent concerns.

The book is divided into three sections. In the first section, Lynch presents what he calls “truisms about truth.” The first truism is that truth is objective. Accepting a kind of Aristotelian realism, Lynch defines “true beliefs” as “those that portray the world as it is and not as we may hope, fear, or wish it to be”. The second truism is that truth is good. The point here is not that truth is morally good, but that it is generally (...) pursued, and the opposite is generally avoided and even ridiculed. Closely related to this is the third truism: truth is a worthy goal of inquiry. The fourth truism is that truth is worth caring about for its own sake. To help recognize this, he refers the reader to the movie, The Matrix. While some may choose to enter the matrix for a short period of bliss, most would prefer to live an authentic life of truth, in the real world. (shrink)

The idiom ‘for someone’s sake’ plays a central role in recent attempts to understand the distinction between impersonal values and personal values—e.g. between what is valuable or good, period, and what is valuable for or good for someone. In the first section three historical approaches to this distinction are outlined. Section 2 presents a modified fitting-attitude analysis of final ‘value-for’ interpreting value-for in terms of there being a reason to favour something ‘for someone’s sake’. Section 3 outlines two arguments against (...) this sort of modified analysis, and then indicates what the rejection of these arguments would involve. This section also identifies an ambiguity in the analysis deriving from the fact that ‘sake’ may be used either evaluatively or non-evaluatively. In Section 4, the modified FA analysis is further clarified. Section 5 focuses on Kevin Mulligan’s recent suggestion that we are struck by personal value; finally, in Section 6, it is shown that an FA analysis admitting of two varieties of goodness may help us understand a certain kind of case that appears paradoxical as long as we assume that there is good, period, and no good-for. (shrink)

Individuals can often take steps to preserve or improve their own health. They can eat appropriate quantities of healthy foods, exercise, and refrain from smoking. They can obtain preventive care and adhere to their physicians’ advice about how best to manage their health. But they often fail to take these steps.A widespread failure to adopt healthy behaviors can significantly erode public health while increasing health care costs. Obesity, for example, increases the risk of heart disease, stroke, liver disease, and certain (...) cancers. By one estimate, it is responsible for almost 10 percent of medical spending in the United States, or about $147 billion per year. Smoking increases the risk of heart disease, stroke, lung disease, and cancer; it accounts for nearly 20 percent of deaths each year in the United States and about $96 billion in health care expenditures. (shrink)

Jeremy Bentham was a British philosopher, jurist, and social reformer. He is regarded as the founder of modern utilitarianism.

The HealthyFood program offers members up to 25% cash back monthly on healthy food purchases. In this randomized controlled trial, we tested the efficacy of financial incentives combined with text messages in increasing healthy food purchases among HF members. Members receiving the lowest cash back level were randomized to one of six arms: Arm 1 : 10% cash back, no weekly text, standard monthly text; Arm 2: 10% cash back, generic weekly text, standard monthly text; Arm 3: 10% cash back, (...) personalized weekly text, standard monthly text; Arm 4: 25% cash back, personalized weekly text, standard monthly text; Arm 5: 10 + 15%NET cash back, personalized weekly text, standard monthly text; and, Arm 6: 10 + 15%NET cash back, personalized weekly text, unbundled monthly text. In the 10 + 15%NET cash back, the cash back amount was the baseline 10% plus 15% of the net difference between healthy and unhealthy spending. The generic text included information on HF and healthy eating, while the personalized text had individualized feedback on purchases. The standard monthly text contained the cash back amount. The unbundled monthly text included the amount lost due to unhealthy purchases. The primary outcome was the average monthly percent healthy food spending. Secondary outcomes were the percent unhealthy food spending, and the percent healthy and unhealthy food items. Of the members contacted, 20 opted out, and 2841 met all inclusion criteria. There were no between-arm differences in the examined outcomes. The largest mean difference in percent healthy spending was between Arm 1 and Arm 2, and the largest mean difference in percent unhealthy spending was also between Arm 1 and Arm 2, but no differences were statistically significant after correction for multiple comparisons. None of the tested financial incentive structures or text strategies differentially affected food purchasing. Notably, more than doubling the cash back amount and introducing a financial disincentive for unhealthy purchases did not affect purchasing. These findings speak to the difficulty of changing shopping habits and to the need for innovative strategies to shift complex health behaviors. NCT02486588 Increasing Engagement with a Healthy Food Benefit. The trial was prospectively registered on July 1, 2015. (shrink)

In a recent letter, Dillion et. al (2023) make various suggestions regarding the idea of artificially intelligent systems, such as large language models, replacing human subjects in empirical moral psychology. We argue that human subjects are in various ways indispensable.

Background: Post-traumatic stress disorder is a prevalent, debilitating, and costly psychiatric disorder. Evidenced-based psychotherapies, including Cognitive Processing Therapy, are effective in treating PTSD, although a fair proportion of individuals show limited benefit from such treatments. CPT requires cognitive demands such as encoding, recalling, and implementing new information, resulting in behavioral change that may improve PTSD symptoms. Individuals with PTSD show worse cognitive functioning than those without PTSD, particularly in acquisition of verbal memory. Therefore, memory dysfunction may limit treatment gains in (...) CPT in some individuals with PTSD. Methods and Analysis: Here, we present a protocol describing the Cognition and PsychoTherapy in PTSD study, a prospective, observational study examining how cognitive functioning affects treatment response in CPT for PTSD. The study aims to recruit 105 outpatient veterans with PTSD between the ages of 18 and 70 years. Prior to beginning 12 sessions of CPT, Veteran participants will have standardized assessments of mood and functioning and complete a comprehensive neurocognitive battery assessing episodic learning, attention and speed of processing, language ability, executive control, and emotional functioning. This study aims to fill gaps in the current literature by: examining the specificity of memory effects on treatment response; exploring how baseline cognitive functioning impacts functional outcomes; and examining potential mechanisms, such as memory for treatment content, that might explain the effects of baseline memory functioning on PTSD symptom trajectory. Discussion: If successful, this research could identify clinically relevant neurocognitive mechanisms that may impact PTSD psychotherapy and guide the development of individualized treatments for PTSD. (shrink)

Men often make riskier decisions than women across a wide range of real-life behaviors. Whether this sex difference is accentuated, diminished, or stable under stressful conditions is, however, contested in the scientific literature. A critical blind spot lies amid this contestation: Most studies use standardized, laboratory-based, cognitive measures of decision making rather than complex real-life social simulation tasks to assess risk-related behavior. To address this blind spot, we investigated the effects of acute psychosocial stress on risk decision making in men (...) and women using a standardized cognitive measure and a novel task that simulated a real-life social situation. Participants were exposed to either an acute psychosocial stressor or an equivalent control condition. Stressor-exposed participants were further characterized as high- or low-cortisol responders. Results confirmed that the experimental manipulation was effective. On the IGT, participants characterized as low-cortisol responders made significantly riskier decisions than those characterized as high-cortisol responders. Similarly, in the online chatroom, participants characterized as low-cortisol responders were, relative to those in the Non-Stress group, significantly more likely to make risky decisions. Together, these results suggest that at lower levels of cortisol both men and women tend to make riskier decisions in both economic and social spheres. (shrink)

Long, Kevin Review(s) of: John Henry Newman: A developing spirituality, by Austin Cooper OMI, (Strathfield, St Paul's Publications, 2012), pp.192, $24.95.

The current Ebola epidemic has presented challenges both medical and ethical. Although we have known epidemics of untreatable diseases in the past, this particular one may be unique in the intensity and rapidity of its spread, as well as ethical challenges that it has created, exacerbated by its geographic location. We will look at the infectious agent and the epidemic it is causing, in order to understand the ethical problems that have arisen.

Long, Kevin Review(s) of: Trent: What happened at the council, by John W. O'Malley, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2013), pp. 335, $39.95.

Perhaps the most fundamental principle of legal interpretation is the presumption that terms should be given their “ordinary” (i.e., general, non-technical) meanings. This principle is a central tenet of modern textualism. Textualists believe a universal presumption of ordinary meaning follows from their theory’s core commitment: A law should be interpreted consistently with what its text communicates to the ordinary public. This Article begins from this textualist premise, empirically examining what legal texts communicate to the public. Five original empirical studies (N (...) = 4,365) reveal a surprising finding: Ordinary people consider genre carefully and regularly take terms in law to communicate technical legal meanings, not ordinary ones. -/- This discovery carries implications for legal interpretation’s theory and practice. Modern textualists—especially at the Supreme Court—justify their theory through “democratic,” fair notice, and rule-of-law appeals to ordinary people. But the empirical studies reveal that fidelity to ordinary people does not imply an unwavering commitment to ordinary meaning. Instead, it requires interpreters to also look to technical meanings. On a practical level, the results support a new presumption of legal meaning and ground a new challenge to textualism’s claim to promote fair notice. As a case study, we consider Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, which held that both sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination are prohibited forms of sex discrimination. The Article’s empirics and theory offer a new justification of the Court’s landmark decision. (shrink)

Phylogenies are increasingly prominent across all of biology, especially as DNA sequencing makes more and more trees available. However, their utility is compromised by widespread misconceptions about what phylogenies can tell us, and improved tree thinking is crucial. The most-serious problem comes from reading trees as ladders from left to right - many biologists assume that species-poor lineages that appear early branching or basal are ancestral - we call this the primitive lineage fallacy. This mistake causes misleading inferences about changes (...) in individual characteristics and leads to misrepresentation of the evolutionary process. The problem can be rectified by considering that modern phylogenies of present-day species and genes show relationships among evolutionary cousins. Emphasizing that these are extant entities in the 21st century will help correct inferences about ancestral characteristics, and will enable us to leave behind 19th century notions about the ladder of progress driving evolution. (shrink)